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SELLING THE IDEA TO TELL THE TRUTH:

THE PROFESSIONAL INTERROGATOR
AND MODERN CONFESSIONS LAW
JOSEPH D. GRANO"
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS

(3d edition).

By Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, and Joseph P. Buckley. Baltimore:
Williams & Wilkins. 1986. Pp. xvii, 353. $28.50
Of necessity, therefore, interrogators must deal with criminal suspects on a somewhat lower moral plane than that upon which ethical,
law-abiding citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs. That
plane, in the interest of innocent suspects, need only be subject to the
following restriction: Although both "fair" and "unfair" interrogation
practices are permissible, nothing shall be done or said to the suspect
that will be apt to make an innocent person confess. [p. xvii]
I share the view that not many innocent men (at least those of average intelligence and educational background) are likely to succumb to
these "methods of debatable propriety." But how many innocent men are
likely to be subjected to these methods? How "tough" would the American
lawyer's reaction be if he had some notion of "the price" we pay in terms
of human liberty and individual dignity?1

I. INTRODUCTION

The third edition of CriminalInterrogationand Confessions is a
book in two parts. The first part, an instruction manual, strives
to teach professional interrogators how to obtain a confession
from a guilty suspect who is not inclined to confess. The second
part contains an analysis of the law pertaining to police interrogation. Touted as "an entirely new book" (p. v), the third edition, particularly in the first part, actually replicates much of
' Originally printed in 84 MICH. L. REV. 662 (1986).
"Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1965,J.D. 1968, Temple University; L.L.M. 1970, University of Illinois.

1Kamisar,

What is an "Involuntary"Confeasion..Some Comments on Inbauand Reids Criminal In-

terrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 732 (1963) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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what is found in the earlier editions. The organization, however, is much more elaborate: while the second edition, for example, simply listed from A to Z the tactics and techniques for
successful interrogation, the third edition has rearranged these
tactics into "nine steps to effectiveness" (pp. 77-84).3 Beginning
with immediate efforts to "disarm" the suspect from the moment the interrogator is introduced (p. 84-85), moving deliberately to the "critical stage" when the increasingly apprehensive
suspect has become indecisive about whether he should continue to lie (p. 159), proceeding quickly thereafter to the suspect's first admission of guilt (pp. 165-70), and concluding with
a detailed oral and then written confession (pp. 171-78), the
new organization offers the interrogator a systematic strategy for
"selling the suspect on the idea to tell the truth" (p. 154).
While the authors' suggested interrogation tactics, even if
refined and rearranged, have remained largely the same, each
edition of this book has come forward against a different backdrop of constitutional law. Because then prevailing due process
doctrine made denial of counsel merely one factor to consider
in a voluntariness determination,4 the first edition, published in
1962, appropriately could suggest means to dissuade a suspect
from persisting in an expressed desire to remain silent or to
consult a lawyer.5 Escobedo v. Illinois6 and Miranda v. Arizona,7
however, prompted a second edition just five years later. Although the embittered authors conceded that the police had a
legal and moral obligation to comply with the strictures of these
new cases, they also insisted that most of the first edition's tac-

' F. INBAU &J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS iX-X (2d ed. 1967). Joseph

Buckley did notjoin the book until the third edition.
'The second step, "theme development," offers eleven themes for interrogator to develop,
pp. viii-ix; each was presented as a "tactic" or "technique" in the second edition. Id The
authors have summarized the nine steps on a small card that accompanies the book. While convenient, the card is less wieldy than the Mirandacards the police often carry.
'See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
5 F. INBAU &J.REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 111-12 (1962).
6378 U.S. 478 (1964) (recognizing sixth amendment right to counsel, at least upon request,
during custodial police interrogation). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with its much
broader holding, quickly eclipsed Escobedo. While Escobedo's result would remain the same today
under Miranda,the Court is now of the view that Fscobedo should have been decided on fifth and
not sixth amendment grounds. See note 19 infraand accompanying text.
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (promulgating, pursuant to the fifth amendment,
elaborate warning
and waiver requirements prior to custodial interrogation).
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tics still could be used after such compliance. 8 Nevertheless, the
authors had doubts and fears:
If we are in error with regard to our interpretation of the Miranda
case, then the Supreme Court has but one more move to make, and that
is to outlaw all interrogations of criminal suspects. We say this because
of our confidence that effective interrogations can
9 only be conducted by
such procedures as the ones we herein describe.
As the authors recognize in the preface to the third edition,
the law governing police interrogation has changed considerably since they expressed these fears (p. v). Miranda remains
alive, but the present Supreme Court has signaled clearly that it
will not make "one more move" to eliminate police interrogation.10 Indeed, those who worship at Miranda's shrine view several of the Court's recent decisions as the prelude to Miranda's
ultimate demise." Emboldened by these recent developments,
the authors now confidently urge the police to read Miranda
more narrowly than they suggested in the second edition.12
While the authors have good reason for much of their confidence, the third edition nevertheless should leave informed
readers with an uneasy sense that a fundamental tension exists
between the book's suggested tactics and the underlying principles, if not the most recent holdings, of modern confessions law.
The interrogation tactics the authors advocate do not comfortably coexist with the normative foundations of cases like Escobedo
and Miranda, even as narrowly read. Similarly, as the introductory quotations to this essay illustrate, the philosophy of the
authors is poles apart from that of Miranda's most passionate
defenders, such as Professor Yale Kamisar.1 3 While the authors
'F. INBAU &J.REID, supra note 2, at 1.

' Id.; see also id. at 195-97 (expressing some concern that the Court might prohibit police
trickery).
SeeMoran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
" See, &g., Ramisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It
Realy, So Prosecution Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices in THE BURGER COURT: THE
COUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 82-86 (V. Blasi ed. 1983); Stone, The Miranda Doctrinein the
Burger Court, 1977 SuP. Cr. REv. 99. But see Kamisar, supra at 86-90. As a critic of Miranda,I recenty have argued that the Court has undermined Miranda's legitimacy by its current understanding of what it did in that case. Grano, ProphylacticRules in CriminalProcedure: A Question of
Article IILegitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985).
" For example, the recommended warnings and waiver procedure are not as explicit and detailed as in the second edition. Comparepp. 229-30 with F. INBAU &J. REID, supranote 2, at 18182. In addition, the authors now emphasize that police should not repeat or embellish the
warnings, give them prematurely, or substitute written for oral waiver. Pp. 220-32.
" See note 1 supraand preceding text. Over the years, Professor Kamisar has been Professor
Inbau's most persistent critic. See Kamisar,Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance of Being Guilty," 68 J.
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continue to insist on compliance with Miranda,their view of the
function and proper scope of police interrogation is clearly not
the view of Mirandaand its defenders. 4
The present Supreme Court would not have spawned
Miranda. Nevertheless, perhaps because of institutional considerations, the Court seems disinclined to take the drastic step of
overruling Mirandaand rethinking the basic premises of confessions law. Although judicial restraint is usually praiseworthy, in
this context it can only assure continuation of the tension between Miranda's philosophical assumptions and those that to a
large extent the present Court and the authors share. Moreover, the Court's failure to resolve this tension increases the likelihood that a future Court will take the step that worried the
authors twenty years ago, for someday the tension will have to
be resolved.
In section II of this essay, I attempt to illustrate the tension
between the authors' suggested tactics and premises of modem
confessions law. My purpose is to show that the authors' approach to police interrogation is pervasively, not just occasionally, inconsistent with both strands of thought that have
influenced current legal doctrine. Section III critiques these
retwo strands of thought and argues that the tension should be
5
law.1
confessions
modem
of
premises
the
rejecting
by
solved

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977).

Professor Kamisar's writings on confession law are col-

lected and updated in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1980).
' Mirandds extensive criticism of the first edition of the authors' book makes this apparent.
See 384 U.S. at 448-55 & nn.9-23.
" This essay does not review the authors' legal analysis in part two of the book. It should be
noted, however, that this part of the book is not completely satisfactory. First, although chapter
eight is intended for nonlawyers and chapter nine for prosecutors, p. xiii, the chapters are
equally lacking in depth and largely repetitious. Second, the authors' treatment of the law is
sometimes confising if not misleading. For example, they continue to suggest, contrary to the
facts, that the old due process voluntariness test was based on the concern of excluding untrustworthy confessions. Pp. 246-47. In addition, they fail to distinguish clearly fifth and sixth
amendment cases, pp. 238, 295, 303, even though the Court's doctrine in these two areas is different. Their repeated discussion of Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (sixth amendment
holding) in the context of Miranda issues is particularly distracting.
As an overview for police officers, the authors' legal analysis may be sufficient. Unfortunately, the authors could have done much more to support their philosophy of police interrogation.
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL INTERROGATION AND
THE PREMISES OF MODERN CONFESSIONS LAW

Putting aside specific doctrinal holdings and concentrating
on philosophical underpinnings, two strands of thought have
influenced modem confessions law. The first, most apparent in
sixth amendment cases but infecting fifth amendment cases as
well, is that a suspect needs and should have assistance in
matching wits with the police during interrogation. 16 The second, most prevalent in fifth amendment cases, is that a custodial
suspect needs and should have protection against the pressures
to confess that are generated by interrogation. For those who
typically applaud Warren Court decisions, these strands are not
separate and independent but rather interrelated expressions of
what human dignity requires.
A. POLICE INTERROGATION AND INTELLIGENT CHOICE
Although Escobedo v. Illinois18 has little vitality today
amendment case, 19 its reasoning, which illustrates

as a sixth
the first
strand of modem confessions thinking, still exerts influence.
After the police confronted Escobedo with an accomplice who
"In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court's primary concern was the presence
of "compulsion," but the concern discussed in the text is also apparent. For example, the Court
frowned on the use of trickery. 384 U.S. at 451-53. It also expressed concern about the suspect's
ability to make an "intelligent" decision whether to remain silent, a decision in which he would
appreciate the consequences of agreeing to talk. 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Court suggested that
the suspect should be reminded that the police are not acting solely in his interest, and it
opined that those who do not request counsel typically are most in need of counsel's assistance.
384 U.S. at 469-71. Miranda's defenders similarly combine a concern about compulsion with a
concern about the suspect making an intelligent, rational choice. See the authorities cited in
note 17 infra.
The Court today is much less inclined to mix sixth amendment concerns in its fifth amendment analysis. SeeMoran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (failure of police to inform suspect
that lawyer wanted to see him does not invalidate Mirandawaiver or otherwise violate Constituton).
17 Se4eg., Schrock, Welsh & Collins, InterrogationalRights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona,
52 S. CAi. L. REV. 1, 42 n.174 (1978); White, Police Trickety in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 581 (1979); see alsoY. KAMIsAR, supranote 13, at 211-24.
'378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"Since Escobedo, the Court has held that sixth amendment rights attach not at custody but
only at or after the start of adversaryjudicial proceedings. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135
(1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); see also Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A
Need to Reconsider the ConstitutionalPremises Underlyingthe Law of Confessions, 17 AM CRIM. L. REV. 1,
5-31 (1979) (reviewing the Court's cases). The demise of Escobedo as a sixth amendment case
actually occurred in Miranda. See id. at 6 n.38. Escobedo's reasoning still controls sixth amendment analysis, however, when the interrogation occurs after the start of adversary judicial proceedings. SeeMichigan v.Jackson 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986).
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accused him of the fatal shooting, Escobedo responded that the
accomplice, not he, had fired the shots. The Supreme Court
sympathetically observed that Escobedo as a layman undoubtedly was unaware that his admission of complicity was as damaging as an admission that he had fired the fatal shots. 20 The
Court stated that Escobedo needed counsel's legal aid and advice, because what resulted during the interrogation could affect the later trial.2 1 Absent the right to counsel's advice, the
trial would be "no more than an appeal from the interrogation,"
with conviction virtually assured by the suspect's confession.
We can appreciate how remarkable this reasoning is only by
focusing clearly on the evils the Court identified as warranting
relief. The primary evil is the suspect making an uninformed
and unintelligent decision to confess. To assure an informed
and intelligent decision, one that comports with the suspect's
best interests, counsel should be present to provide aid and advice. A second evil is the police obtaining evidence from the
suspect that will help assure his conviction. The suspect will not
have much chance of mounting an effective defense at trialthat is, of winning an acquittal-if he confesses, and for some
this is undesirable even when the
reason, not articulated,
23
suspect is guilty.

If these concerns are legitimate, the tactics the authors advocate should have no place in our law. Indeed, if one takes Escobedo's reasoning seriously, all police interrogation should be
prohibited until the defendant has had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer. Under Escobedo's constitutional vision, we
cannot rest comfortably with a system that permits the availability of legal assistance to turn on the suspect's hurried response
to a less than enthusiastic police warning. Indeed, the procurement of legal advice must depend in such a system more on
chance than on a reasoned exercise of judgment. 24 Of course,
as the authors and others know, provision of counsel to all de'0 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486.

378 U.S. at 486-89.
378 U.S. at 487-88.
See Caplan, QuestioningMiranda,38 VAND L. REV. 1417, 1438-43 (1985). Escobedo also referred to the danger of compulsory self-incrimination. See 378 U.S. at 488-89. This facilitated
the Court's subsequent reinterpretation of Escobedo as a fifth amendment case. See note 19 supra.
2 Cf Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY& POLICE ScI. 21, 40-41 (1961) (effectiveness of warning depends upon its emphasis and spirit).
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fendants before interrogation would facilitate intelligent choice
only by virtually eliminating the possibility of confessions, for
the only advice a competent lawyer typically will give, garticulaly if the suspect is guilty, is not to make a statement. This,
however, is the necessary price of taking Escobedo seriously.
To avoid having to justify either Escobedo's premises or our
tolerance of unexacting waivers, some may be willing to accept
the present system as an uneasy compromise between the logical ramifications of these premises and the feared elimination
of police interrogation. Those with this understanding may
think it more productive to use Escobedo's reasoning to identify
interrogation tactics that undermine the suspect's ability to appreciate the significance of an admission or confession. The
contradictions in modem confessions law, however, cannot be
avoided by this strategy, for candid analysis necessitates the conclusion that Escobedo's reasoning prohibits not just certain interrogation tactics but interrogation itself.
The authors' book illustrates this point. The tension between Escobedo and the authors' philosophy does not arise in isolated passages that graphically depict successful strategies of
deceit and trickery but rather permeates the entire book. In the
Preface, for example, Inbau praises Reid, his now deceased coauthor, as an interrogation specialist who "personally trained
many persons to become excellent interrogators" (p. v). Similarly, the authors argue that ideally only intelligent officers who
have studied "the art of criminal interrogation" should be permitted to conduct interrogations (p. 35). An intelligent, welltrained interrogator, however, is likely to convince a guilty suspect to tell the truth, a decision that will help assure conviction
and that the suspect typically will come to regret. In the battle
of wits, the professional interrogator trained in psychology is
more likely than the untrained officer to outsmart the suspect
and obtain an incriminating statement. Under Escobedo's reasoning, an excellent, professional interrogator should be deplored rather than applauded.
The professional interrogator is only the first difficulty. In
the name of human dignity, academic commentators frequently
denounce as improper interrogation tactics that take advantage
' SeeWatts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,59 (1949) (Jackson,J., dissenting). A confession in a plea
bargaining context may be advantageous, but a confession to the police typically is not in the

suspect's interest.
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of inexperienced and ignorant suspects.'6 Undoubtedly to the
consternation of such critics, the authors demonstrate in their
book that morally neutral procedures, which no one would
condemn, and courteous, polite procedures, which critics would
applaud, have as their purpose and effect the same function of
outwitting the suspect. For example, the authors instruct the interrogator not to take notes, for taking notes "may grimly remind the suspect of the legal significance or implication of an
incriminating remark" (p. 36). They insist that the interrogator
should wear civilian clothes, for otherwise "the suspect will be
reminded constantly of police custody and the possible consequences of an incriminating disclosure" (p. 36). They even
warn against bad breath, distracting facial appearances, and
clothing disarray, for all of these may annoy or distract the suspect and reduce "the effectiveness of an interrogation" (pp. 3738). If the authors' advice is sound, those who aim to protect
the suspect's ability to act in his best interests should insist that
only inexperienced, disheveled, uniformed officers, with garlic
on their breath, conduct interrogations.
The authors also admonish the interrogator to be polite
and courteous to the suspect. For example, the interrogator
should use the suspect's last name, preceded by Mr., Mrs., or
Miss, particularly if the suspect has a low economic status (pp.
38-39). By thus flattering the person and providing him a sense
of dignity from such unaccustomed courtesy, "the interrogator
will enhance the effectiveness of whatever he says or does thereafter" (p. 39). To illustrate the importance of courteous behavior, the authors tell of a murder suspect whom a police officer
inappropriately addressed as an "old whore." To counter this
negative tactic, and to win the suspect's confidence, the interrogator (one of the authors) displayed respect and concern for
the suspect. Thus, upon learning that she had not eate!, he obtained food for her: By treating her "as a 'lady,"' he soon had
the desired confession (pp. 39-40). Similarly, the authors instruct the interrogator not to use derogatory names, even in jest,
toward homosexuals or racial minorities (pp. 40, 199). Indeed,
in dealing with a homosexual, "[i] t is much more effective" for
the interrogator to act as if homosexuality is morally acceptable
" See Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and ConstitutionalRight 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 40-41
(1981); Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modem Law of Confessions, 1975
WASH. U. L.Q. 275; see alsoWhite, supranote 17.
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(pp. 40, 99). The skillful interrogator must "[r] ecognize that in
everyone there is some good," for the suspect's good characteristics can be utilized in the effort for a successful interrogation
(p. 42).
While many will applaud this advice, the authors offer it not
because they believe such police behavior is morally mandated
but because such behavior will help the interrogator to obtain a
confession. As candidly stated in an appendix reviewing the
psychological principles of police interrogation, the goal of the
entire interrogation process is "to decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confessing" (p. 332). This is precisely what Escobedo and Mirandaaimed to combat28 and what the
defenders of these cases excoriate.
To be sure, most of the authors' suggested stratagems are
not so benign. Having directly confronted the suspect with belief in his guilt at the beginning of the interrogation (pp. 8493), the interrogator should next develop a "theme," which either will present a moral excuse for the crime or minimize its
moral implications (p. 93). Possible themes include, among
others, that anyone under similar conditions would have done
the same thing (pp. 97-99), that the suspect had a more acceptable motivation for the crime than the one actually surmised
(pp. 102-06), that others, including the victim, deserve condemnation (pp. 106-18), and that the victim or witnesses must
be exaggerating (pp. 120-25). By seeking to convince the suspect that he is less morally reprehensible than the facts of the
case indicate, the various themes "establish the psychological
foundation to achieve an implicit, if not explicit, early, general
admission of guilt" (p. 97). If the suspect denies the crime, the
interrogator may use a "baiting" question, such as 'Jim, is there
any reason you can think of why one of Mary's neighbors would
say your car was seen parked in front of her home that night?"
Not knowing whether his car was seen, the suspect, if he is
guilty, must decide whether to deny or explain this accusation;
either way, he runs the risk of being caught in a lie (pp. 68-73) .29
"The Appendix, twenty pages entitled "The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation," was authored by Brian C. Jayne, who is Director of the Reid College of Detection of Deception. Pp. 327-47.
"With regard to Mirandaand this concern, see note 16 supraand accompanying text.
" Similarly, if Jim says he was out driving on a certain road, the interrogator can ask him
about a fictitious accident that interfered with traffic. IfJim has been lying, he now faces a dilemma: if he denies observing the accident and it occurred, the interrogator will have caught
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The authors' case examples illustrate the significance of deceit in the interrogation process. In one case, an interrogator
told a seventeen-year-old arrested for rape that the youth hardly
could avoid what he did; the interrogator also stated that he too,
as a boy in high school, had "roughed it up" with a girl attempting to have intercourse. The boy, who thereafter confessed, was
so relieved that he later explained to his father that the interrogator had once done the same thing (p. 98). In a child molestation case, the interrogator suggested that the child was well
advanced for her age. and probably tried to excite the suspect
(p. 108). The authors contend that the same tactic frequently is
successful in rape cases (pp. 108-09). 3o While this strategy of
casting blame on innocent victims may seem of doubtful utility,
the authors maintain that it works because offenders want to
blame their victims for their crimes (p. 108).
The authors indicate that the interrogator may ease certain
suspects into an admission by suggesting excuses like accident,
intoxication, or self-defense (pp. 102-03, 166). Indeed, the seventh step in the interrogation plan is to offer the suspect an alternative question, one that presents a choice between a
repulsive motivation for the crime and an error attributable to
human frailty (p. 165). Once the suspect makes an admission,
the interrogator should begin to develop a detailed and true account. Often the interrogator will have to persuade the suspect
to abandon the moral excuse that he successfully used to
prompt the suspect's first admission (pp. 103, 173). Even if the
suspect does not abandon this excuse, the inconsistency between his original denial and the assertions in his confession
will make the excuse seem implausible at trial (p. 104). In developing a full confession, the interrogator should abandon his
earlier reluctance to use words that might conjure up the legal
consequences of confessing, like burglary and rape (pp. 37, 85).
With an admission in hand, the interrogator now freely should
use such descriptive words "so that when these words are used in
the formal written confession, the suspect will be accustomed to
them" (p. 172).
him in a lie; if he admits observing the accident and it did not occur, the interrogator again will
have caught him in a lie. P. 74. Although I have stated in the text that this tactic is less benign
than those previously discussed, I cannot comprehend why anyone would object to it.
' During interrogation, the goal is not to defend the victim's honor, protect the victim's sensibilities, or vindicate the themes of law and order, the goal is to persuade the guilty suspect to
confess. Once the suspect confesses, of course, these other concerns will be satisfied.
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Whatever one thinks of these tactics, they all have the objective previously mentioned: to convince a suspect who is not so
inclined to abandon a false denial and to admit the truth (p.
154). Telling the truth, however, typically is not in the best interests of guilty suspects. In terms of preserving defenses for
trial or a position of strength for plea bargaining, the rational,
intelligent course of action for a guilty suspect, assuming he
chooses to respond at all, is to persist in a denial of the crime.3'
Thus, if we were serious about enabling the suspect to protect
his best interests during police interrogation, everything the
authors recommend, from insincere politeness to overt trickery,
would be disallowed.
Of course, some of the authors' tactics may seem more offensive than others. Although, as the authors demonstrate, the
issue of what is offensive may be debatable, most would agree, at
least in concept, that truly offensive interrogation techniques
should be prohibited. Once distinctions are made on grounds
of perceived offensiveness, however, it must be conceded that
protection of the suspect's ability to appreciate the significance
and consequences of his actions is not our real concern. At
least this must be conceded absent empirical evidence that "offensive" tactics outwit the suspect more successfully than inoffensive ones.
To shift the legal focus from the suspect's ability to make an
intelligent choice to offensive police tactics is to move in the direction of vindicating the authors' position on police interrogation. First, such a shift eliminates Escobedo's line of argument for
a right to counsel's assistance during police interrogation.
While counsel may be necessary to ensure intelligent choice,
counsel is not necessary to prohibit offensive interrogation
techniques: neutral observers behind one-way mirrors could accomplish such a limited goal. Second, such a shift in the legal
concern resolves some of the tension and contradictions in the
status quo. It does this by denying Escobedo's unsupported premise that an evil occurs whenever an interrogator outsmarts the
defendant by persuading him to admit, truthfully and against
his best interests, involvement in the crime.

" Of course the most intelligent course of action is simply to refuse to answer questions.
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B. POLICE INTERROGATION AND COMPULSION

Although Miranda v. Arizon 2 reflects some of Escobedo's reasoning, it primarily illustrates the second strand of modem confessions thinking--the desire to protect the suspect from
compulsion. While the due process voluntariness doctrine always reflected this concern, 3 Mirandafor the first time viewed as
evil the mere "inherent compulsion" of custodial interrogation.Y As Justice Harlan's dissent demonstrates, before Miranda
the Court had not read the fifth amendment as prohibiting "all
pressure to incriminate one's sef'; -" rather, the Court's concern
had been "to sift out undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous
confessions. ' 6
The MirandaCourt viewed the warnings it promulgated and
the waiver requirements it imposed as "protective devices" that
would "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." T Of course, contradictions immediately were apparent.
If a simple response to a single custodial question must be
viewed as presumptively compelled, the possibility of having a
voluntary waiver is difficult to understand8 Similarly, if the
right to counsel's presence in this fifth amendment sense arises
because "[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely
made aware of his privilege," 39 allowing the defendant to subject
himself to such overbearing pressures by waiving his rights is incomprehensible. One can comprehend the concept of waiver
with respect to rights such as trial by jury, but as Justice Marshall
remarked in a different context, "no sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free of compulsion." ° Apart from
whether a sane person would make such a waiver, no decent sys32384 U.S. 436 (1966).

"See genera/ly Grano, Voluntariness,Free WA and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859,
874-80,896-909 (1979).
384 U.S. at 458,467,468,478.
384 U.S. at 512 (Harlan,J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan,J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
"384 U.S. at 458.
"384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). The incongruities help explain why the present
Court has found it so easy to read Mirandaas having promulgated a mere "prophylactic rule,"
one designed to combat the potentialforcompulsion rather than actual compulsion. While such
a reading can help make sense of Miranda,it destroys the case's legitimacy as constitutional law.
See Grano, supra note 11.
" 384 U.S. at 469.
4"Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 280-81 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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tem of law would permit a person to relinquish his right not to
be subject to pressures that overbear the will.4 Finally, even if
the concern is an "intelligent decision" with regard to the exercise of fifth amendment rights, 42 the likelihood of achieving in-

telligent choice when the waiver decision must be made quickly
in the police station is small 3
Inherent compulsion is the compulsion that is present in
any custodial interrogation. If inherent compulsion is an evil to
be eradicated, it must follow that any additional pressures the
police bring to bear upon the suspect also are impermissible.
As before, however, this cannot be taken seriously unless one is
prepared to prohibit all custodial questioning by a professional
interrogator. For if the first goal of the skillful interrogator is
"to decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of
confessing,"" the second is to "increas[e] the suspect's internal
anxiety associated with his deception" (p. 332).
The authors' suggestions for increasing anxiety begin with
the interrogation room, which should be free of any small objects that the suspect might fumble with as a tension-relieving
activity. Such activity "can detract from the effectiveness of the
interrogation, especially during the critical phase when a guilty
person may be trying desperately to suppress an urge to confess"
(p. 29). Similarly, because smoking may relieve tension or "bolster . . . resistance to an effective interrogation," the room

should be free of ashtrays. Moreover, the interrogator should
discourage smoking by abstaining himself and by suggesting, if a
request is made, that the suspect wait until he leaves the room
(p. 38). Likewise, chairs that induce slouching or leaning back
are "psychologically undesirable" (p. 30). The interrogator
4 Semantic precision is important here. If we are talking about "a right of silence," the con-

cept of waiver makes sense: by agreeing to talk, the suspect waives his right of silence. While
Mirandadoes make reference to such a right, the passage under discussion in the text, which is
truer to the constitutional language, speaks of the defendant's right not to be "compelled" to
become a witness against himself. If custodial interrogation very quickly can "overbear the will"
of a suspect, even one warned of a right not to answer, then the Court's waiver doctrine permits
the suspect to waive his right to be free of such overbearing pressure. One can put this in perspective by imagining such a waiver doctrine with regard to torture.
Miranda'ssupporters may be tempted immediately to switch from a "compulsion" argument
to a "right of silence" argument. In reality, the latter right does not exist. See text at notes 12122 infra.
,.384 U.S. at 468.
4
3See
notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
' See text at note 27 supra.
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should sit about four or five feet away from the suspect, with no
furniture in between them. "Sitting or standing a long distance
away or the presence of an obstruction of any sort... affords a
guilty suspect a certain degree of relief and confidence not otherwise attainable" (p. 37).
The emphasis on increasing anxiety is evident throughout
the book. The authors suggest that someone other than the interrogator should escort the suspect into the interrogation
room, direct him to the appropriate chair, and provide him the
name of the person who will be talking to him. This formal
identification procedure "tends to heighten the apprehension
of a guilty suspect by reason of the apparent exalted status of
the interrogator"; it also tends to diminish the suspect's confidence in his ability to evade detection (p. 37). After about five
minutes, the interrogator should enter deliberately and with "an
air of confidence." Emulating a busy medical specialist, the interrogator should be polite but professional. If the suspect offers his hand, the interrogator should respond with a "very
casual handshake"; otherwise the interrogator should offer a
brief greeting without shaking hands (p. 84). The preliminaries
over, the interrogator's first step, at least with suspects whose
guilt seems reasonably certain, should be a direct, positive
statement, expressed in a "slow, deliberate, and confident manner," that the police believe the suspect committed the offense
(pp. 84-85). Psychologically, this "tends to shatter the welldeveloped network of defense mechanisms that the suspect has
established since committing the crime" (p. 345).
As the interrogation proceeds, the interrogator should increase the suspect's feelings of uneasiness about lying and prevent occurrences that would enable the suspect to regain
confidence. If the suspect begins to cry, the interrogator should
not leave the suspect alone to "cry it out," for "the suspect who
is given that opportunity may fortify himself and return to the
denial stage" (p. 164). Because the interrogator must not permit role reversal to occur, he should correct a suspect who attempts to flatter the interrogator by inflating his title (p. 120).
The interrogator must make "every discreet effort" to prevent
repeated denials of the crime, for this "deprives the guilty suspect of the psychological fortification that would be derived
from repetitious disclaimers of guilt" (pp. 142-43).
The critical stage of the interrogation occurs when the suspect experiences tension between an "aroused impulse to con-
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fess" and his perception of the consequences of confessing. At
this point, if the suspect regains his composure, the gains of the
interrogator's prior efforts will be lost (p. 159). The interrogator should now move his chair closer: "This will decrease the
suspect's confidence while simultaneously increasing anxiety"
(pp. 159-60). The interrogator should move in small increments without stopping the conversation or losing eye contact:
"A guilty suspect will usually be aware of an increased feeling of
uneasiness as the interrogator moves closer but often will not
consciously recognize that the cause for it is the physical proximity of the interrogator. The suspect simply senses or perceives
that lying is becoming more uncomfortable" (p. 161).
The authors do impose limits on what "a professionally
skilled and ethical interrogator" (p. 129) may do to increase the
suspect's anxiety. Although the interrogator must be patient
and persistent, conveying the impression that he has "all the
time in the world," he may not engage in "unreasonably long interrogations" (pp. 195-96) .

Likewise, while the interrogator

should confront the suspect with belief in his guilt, he should
not extend an accusation "beyond the point where mental distress becomes a reasonable probability" (p. 93). The interrogator should avoid anger and personal involvement, for
interrogation "should be strictly a professional undertaking" (p.
195). The authors do endorse the "friendly-unfriendly" act
when other techniques of sympathy and understanding have
failed, but during the unfriendly episode the interrogator may
resort only to verbal condemnation of the suspect; "under no
circumstances should physical abuse or threats of abuse or other
mistreatment ever be employed" (pp. 151-53). Indeed, as the
appendix explains, the concept of increasing the suspect's anxiety refers only to "the suspect's internal feelings of uneasiness as
a result of his own cognitive dissonance"; it is not intended to
suggest "use of any threats, coercion, or abuse to the suspect"
(p. 332).
As with tactics designed to outsmart the suspect, distinctions
can be made in terms of perceived offensiveness among tactics
designed to increase the suspect's anxiety. The point remains,
however, that all such tactics, whether or not "offensive," are intended to increase the pressure-the compulsion-on the sus' The authors suggest that a skillful interrogator rarely will need more than four hours to
obtain a confession. P. 310.
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pect to confess. The "inherent compulsion" of custodial interrogation would be present if an untrained, uniformed officer
questioned the suspect in the stationhouse receiving room.45
The professional interrogator, with his anxiety-inducing tactics,
is employed precisely because the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation usually are insufficient by themselves to produce the desired confession. If they were sufficient, the who
and how of police interrogation would not be the subject of a
manual.
The tension, therefore, between the authors' book and
Miranda'spremises is inescapable. If orchestrated properly, the
warnings and waiver will occur not simply in the inherently
compelling atmosphere of the stationhouse but in a room purposefully designed to increase the suspect's anxiety. 47 While
those who invoke their Miranda fights will be spared the inherent pressures of questioning, their luckless counterparts who
decide to match wits with the police will be subject to pressures
that make the inherent compulsion of a simple question, such
as "Where were you last night?," 48 pale by comparison.

If we

take seriously Miranda's reasoning, we should not feel comfortable with the authors' "professional interrogator." Conversely,
if we approve the authors' goal of training professionals for successful interrogation, we should be candid in recognizing our
disapproval of Miranda's premises. Without hypocrisy, we cannot have it both ways.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE PREMISES OF MODERN CONFESSIONS LAW
The authors' suggested tactics are based upon the empirical
claim that because self-condemnation and self-destruction are
abnormal, criminal offenders "ordinarily do not utter unsolicited, spontaneous confessions" (p. xvi). This proposition is not

46In the authors' view, "[t]he principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy." P. 24. The authors condemn interrogation efforts that occur with large
numbers of spectators present. Pp. 24-28.
" The authors condemn the giving of premature Mirandawarnings. Pp. 224-25.
Miranda,384 U.S. at 536 (White,J, dissenting). Justice White thought that it defied common sense to suggest that an unwarned response to such a question was compelled. 384 U.S. at
533-34.
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controversial." Similarly, a police officer rarely will obtain a
confession by lecturing the suspect about morality, providing
him a pencil and paper, and trusting that the suspect's conscience will compel the truth (p. xvii). It necessarily follows that
if confessions are viewed as desirable and important, police interrogation must be recognized as a legitimate institution. It
also follows, just as necessarily, that permissible police interrogation must include tactics designed both to outsmart the suspect
and to put pressure on him to confess:
If interrogation is the undoing of deception, what are the elements
of deception that can be undone or influenced? To answer this question
it is useful to evaluate why a person chooses to confess. An individual
will confess (tell the truth) when he perceives the consequences of a
confession as more desirable than the continued anxiety of deception.
If, on the other hand, the consequences of the confession are perceived
as less desirable than the anxiety associated with deception, the individual will continue to lie.... The goal of interrogation, therefore, is to
decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confessing,
suspect's internal anxiety associwhile at the same time increasing the
5
0
ated with his deception .... [p. 332]

The above, of course, does not resolve the debate, for the
option of disfavoring confessions remains. The tension in existing confessions law can be resolved either by rejecting the
premises of Escobedo and Mirandaor by taking these premises seriously and accepting their consequences. Forced to choose,
many would prefer the logical ramifications of Escobedo and
Miranda over a system that permits a professional interrogator
to take advantage of an uncounseled suspect.51 Of course, others may counterclaim that confessions are essential to the task of
solving crime (p. xiv). As a matter of hard reality, this counterCf Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160-61 (1944) (Jackson,J., dissenting) (voluntary
confession is not voluntary "in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one's soul of a
sense of guilt").
" Unless the perceived consequences of confessing are reduced and anxiety is increased, the
suspect will not confess. P. 342. The authors emphasize throughout that they oppose tactics
that would increase the risk of an innocent person confessing. P. xiv. Also, the police may not
reduce the perceived consequences of confessing by making promises of leniency. Pp. 196-97.
As described earlier in this essay, the interrogator aims to reduce the perceived consequences of
confessing by offering a "theme" that suggests a moral excuse for the offender's behavior. See
text at notes 28-29 supra.
" Although he states that Mirandarequired enough things "at one gulp," Professor Kamisar
also has stated that "a rule that a suspect needs counsel to waive counsel is by no means unthinkable." Y. KAMiSAR, supranote 13, at 47 n.11. It is clear that Professor Kamisar would eliminate confessions before he would reconsider Miranda. See id. at 222-23 (suggesting the need to
go further than Miranda), 59-64 (rejecting the argument that confessions are essential to successful law enforcement).
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claim seems difficult to refute, and it may explain the "compromise" that the status quo reflects: the MirandaCourt, though
perhaps 52
desiring to go further, may have believed it impractical
to do so. Nevertheless, such practical compromises ultimately
are unsatisfactory, for they are built upon intellectual dishonesty. 3 We should confront directly whether good reasons exist
to support the premises of Escobedo and Miranda. In my view, we
have not taken the premises of these cases seriously because
they are fundamentally unsound.
A- THE ARGUMENT FOR PERMITING THE INTERROGATOR TO
OUTSMART THE SUSPECT

Escobedo's premises provoke some difficult questions. Why
should the law be concerned that Escobedo admitted involvement in a homicide without realizing that this was as damaging
as an admission that he fired the fatal shots?M Why was the
Court concerned that the "entire thrust" of Escobedo's interrogation was put to him "in such an emotional state as to impair
his capacity for rational judgment?" 5 Why did the Court express concern that Escobedo's confession virtually assured his
conviction for the crime?5 Stated more directly, why should we
not rejoice that Escobedo's lack of intelligence, rational judgment, or sophistication enabled the police to obtain reliable
evidence to prove his guilt? Why would we prefer to increase
the likelihood that defendants like Escobedo will prevail over
their interrogators and thereby 5increase
their chance of win7
trial?
at
acquittals
erroneous
ning
No reasonable person who accepts the basic legitimacy of
society and its laws can endorse the view that a guilty suspect,
like a fox during a hunt, must be given a sporting chance to es-

5, Cf id. at 87-89 (suggesting that Mirandareflects a compromise between two competing positions).
Cf Kuh, Interrogationof CriminalDefendants:Some Irews on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM
L. REV. 233, 235 (1966) (intellectual honesty would require conclusion that voluntary, intelligent waiver is not possible).
See note 20 supraand accompanying text.
Miranda,384 U.S. at 465 (discussing Escobedo).
See notes 21-22 supraand accompanying text.
In attempting to answer these questions, I am drawing on a currently unpublished talk, Police Interrogation and Confessions: A Rebuttal to Misconceived Objections, which I delivered on
February 10, 1986, at the New York University School of Law Center for Research in Crime and
Justice.
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cape conviction and punishment."" Eschewing sporting theory
terminology, many courts and commentators nevertheless express dismay that the suspect is on an "unequal footing with his
interrogators." 59 Reduced to its essentials, however, the desire
for equality between the suspect and interrogator reflects the
6
same sporting theory that the commentators carefully avoid.
To advocate such equality is to express indifference, if not actual hostility, to the likelihood of police success in the interrogation process. Were ascertainment of truth the desideratum,
inequality would be a concern only to the extent it created a risk
of a false confession. Equality between contestants makes for
good sports, but in a criminal investigation we should be seeking truth rather than entertainment.6 1
It should be apparent that the desire for equality between
the suspect and the interrogator is not a reason for limiting interrogation but rather a conclusion itself in need of justification. Echoing Escobedo, some commentators have argued that
the suspect needs equality in the,,62police station "to protect his
chances at the forthcoming trial.
Unfortunately, to justify this
latter goal, one must again fall back on a sporting theory. A system committed to ascertainment of truth would not value for its
own sake the goal of giving guilty defendants some chance to
escape conviction. Of course, the rules of procedure sometimes
purposely increase the risk of erroneous acquittal because of

' Bentham was especially critical ofwhat he labeled the "fox-hunter's" argument for excluding evidence. See 5J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OFJUDICIL EVIDENCE 238 (1827); 7 THE WORKs OF
JEREMYBENTHAM 454 (Bowring ed. 1843); see also Caplan, supranote 23, at 1441-43 (arguing that
Escobedo embraced a sporting theory ofjustice).
'" Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962); see also, e.g., White, supra note 17, at 604
(criticizing police trickery because of the "relative strengths of the suspect and the police in this
context").

The adversary model, which depends on the parties for the development of evidence, requires relatively even resources at trial because inequality increases the risk of inaccuracy. Assuming, however, as the authors insist, that we prohibit police tactics that are likely to induce an
innocent person to confess, the concern for accuracy does not demand equality between a suspect and police interrogator. Indeed, equality in the police station, unlike at trial, impedes the
discovery of truth.
",Unfortunately, "[p]rofessionals sometimes give the appearance of believing that procedure was created for their special interests, not least to provide the entertainment of a fascinating play." Hall, Objectives ofFederalCriminalProceduralRevision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 724 (1942).
"White, supranote 17, at 593. Professor Dix has argued "that a person confessing [should
be] afforded the same opportunities as a person pleading guilty who has not previously confessed." Dix, supranote 26, at 330.
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our special abhorrence of erroneous conviction. 5 It is one
thing, however, to increase a guilty defendant's chances of acquittal at trial to serve some overriding goal, such as protection
of the innocent; it is another to do so when no such other goal
exists. In any event, the purpose of pretrial investigation is to
develop an airtight case against the offender. Nowhere, except
in the rhetoric of confessions law, does the law reflect anxiety
that the investigation may be too successful and thus deny the
defendant a chance for acquittal at trial.
The argument for suspect-interrogator equality cannot be
so easily dismissed when it is made on moral grounds. Professor
Schulhofer, for example, has argued that police manipulation
of the suspect is morally offensive:
The voluntariness test ostensibly took account of special weaknesses of
the person interrogated, but because it did permit the use of substantial
pressures, suspects who were ignorant of their rights, unsophisticated
about police practices and court procedures, easily dominated, or otherwise psychologically vulnerable were more likely to be on the losing
end of a successful police interrogation.... [T]he point [is] simply that
we do (and should) find it unseemly for government officials systemati-

cally to seek out and take advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities
of a citizen. Whether or not one considers such tactics necessary for effective law enforcement, they convey a feeling of manipulation and exploitation of the weak by the. powerful that many would tolerate with at
best considerable reluctance.
Similarly, Professor Greenawalt has maintained that tactics
that "make rational, responsible choice more difficult," such as
playing on a suspect's weaknesses or deceiving the suspect about
crucial facts (for example, whether a confederate
has con'
fessed), do not accord with "autonomy and dignity. 6
Of course, as discussed above, if such manipulation is morally offensive, police interrogation should be abolished, for few
suspects will confess unless rational, responsible choice is made
more difficult. This is the point of the authors' book. As Professor Schulhofer observed in the above quotation, however,
such a practical concern does not seem to address the moral is'Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
constitutionally required). The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt increases the
number of mistaken verdicts in the interest of protecting the innocent C. MCCORMICK,
McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 962 (3d ed. 1984).
" Schuhofer, Confeasion and the Court 79 MICH.L. REV. 865, 871-72 (1981) (footnote omitted).
"Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 40-41; see also Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supranote 17, at 42

n.174; White, supranote 17, at 627-28.
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sue. The more powerful response is that society's morality does
not dictate such conclusions. Confessions law will begin to
make sense only when we have the courage to rebut such moral
claims without hedge or apology. In the context of police interrogation, it simply is not morally offensive to "take advantage of
the psychological vulnerabilities of a citizen."6
Debate about morality often is unsatisfactory. Professor
Dix, for example, has stated that the issue of police interrogation tactics "is not... susceptible to logical debate or empirical
inquiry and thus is a matter that must be resolved according to
an intuitive definition of human dignity."67 This relativistic approach, however, concedes too much to those who find the tactics of successful interrogation immoral. If the Constitution or
morality condemned manipulation and deception, the legal system would have to prohibit altogether practices such as wiretapping and the use of informants. These practices do not give
the suspect a rational choice between silence and self-damaging
admissions, nor do they ensure that his admissions will be made
"with as complete an understanding of his tactical position as
possible."r From a comparative standpoint, these practices do
not seem more respectful of "autonomy and dignity" than the
ordinary tactics of police interrogation. In Hoffa v. United
States,g for example, the informant, Partin, certainly manipulated and exploited Jimmy Hoffa as much as custodial interrogation would have done;0 indeed, direct rather than surreptitious
interrogation at least would have alerted Hoffa to the risk of
trickery and deceit. Of course, the police often employ wiretapping and informants before they take the suspect into custody, but the fact of custody does not seem relevant to the moral
question of inappropriate exploitation.
It may be countered at this point that the analogy to wiretapping and the use of informants begs the question, for these

" Schulhofer, supra note 64, at 872. The authors weaken their case by arguing that both
"fair and 'unfair" practices are acceptable in police interrogation. P. xvii. The better argument
is that the authors' suggested tactics are not unfair in this context.
Dix, supra note 26, at 336.

'7

"Id. at 380-31.
385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Se-385 U.S. at 294-300 (detailing how Partin deceived and manipulated Hoffa).
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practices also may be morally offensive.' Such a claim, however
is counterintuitive, and it does not comport with society's morality as reflected in its law. While limits exist, such as in the law of
entrapment,2 trickery and deception as weapons in the arsenal
of law enforcement have a long history of approval. Indeed,
even outside of law enforcement, lying and deception always
have been difficult issues that still lack categorical answers."
While commentators such as Schulhofer may be in the vanguard of a new morality, they clearly are not in step with either
the past or present thinking of our society. Moreover, it must
be remembered that the moral issue in the law of confessions
arises in a constitutional context. The argument for imposing
through constitutional dictate a minority morality, rooted neither in history nor tradition, is not apparent.
In considering the moral issue, it also is appropriate to recall that while the police often use informants to develop probable cause, custodial interrogation typically occurs after a lawful
arrest supported by probable cause. "The subjects of such interrogation, therefore, cannot be presumed innocent in a literal
sense but instead must be viewed as persons justifiably subject to
certain state restraints and inconveniences that otherwise would
not be acceptable."74 In the authors' words, many situations exist in which the "public welfare requires relinquishment of some
personal comfort or even a sacrifice of a measure of protection
from governmental intrusion" (p. 91). I have made the same
point previously in another context:
Legal scholars have 6onstructed various "models" to describe the
criminal justice system. These models, often couched in loaded terms,
include the due process model, the crime control model, and even the
family model.... In thinking about the criminal justice system, we need
a renewed commitment to the common law view that the individual cannot live in isolation, oblivious to the community's needs. One who
shares the benefits of community living may legitimately be expected to

" Cf Skolnick, Deception by Police; CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1982, at 40, 41-42 (suggesting that police deception in the investigatory stages may breed a willingness to commit per-

jury).
n See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (taking a narrow view of the entrapment
defense).
"For recent attempts to treat the subject, see S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIvATE LIFE (1978); C. FRIED, RIGHTAND WRONG 54-78 (1978).
4
Grano, supranote 33, at 902 (foomote omitted).
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make reasonable sacrifices on behalf of the community's efforts to solve
and control crime.75

This may seem excessively utilitarian, but assessment of the
community's interests must inform to some extent moral
evaluations of governmental conduct.
None of this is to deny that constitutional and moral limits
exist on what an interrogator may do to outwit a suspect. As
previously discussed, deception is not acceptable when it is
likely to induce a false confession (p. 216). Likewise, it would
not be acceptable for an interrogator to induce a confession by
making a false promise of leniency76 or by posing as a jail chap-

lain or defense lawyer (pp. 216-17). That some trickery and deception are morally acceptable does not mean that "some
extreme version of the battle model"77 governs the investigatory

process. Whether viewed in terms of what shocks the conscience, as the authors state it (p. 216), or in terms of moral
principles "rooted... in history or in widely shared contemporary morality," as I once stated it,7 some interrogation tactics

exceed the bounds of moral tolerance. The line between the
acceptable and the unacceptable sometimes may be difficult to
draw, but this should not count as a reason for throwing the
baby out with the bath.
The moral argument against successful interrogation tactics
sometimes is varied to express a concern about equality among
suspects. Professor Greenawalt, for example, has complained
that tactics such as deception "work unevenly by undermining
the inexperienced and ignorant [while] having little effect on
the hardened criminal." This argument does not have merit.
The inexperienced and ignorant suffer disadvantages at every
turn: they are more apt to leave clues at the crime scene, less
likely to take precautions against wiretapping and informants,
and more likely to be caught in deception by skillful crossexamination at trial. In any event, the ability of the sophisticated criminal to escape conviction and punishment hardly
"Grano, ProbableCauseand Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics ofIllinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 465, 497 (1984): cf.Caplan, supra note 23, at 1454 (questioning how human dignity is
advanced when a suspect maintains silence in the face ofjustifiable accusation).
"Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (due process violated by failure to keep
promise that induced guilty plea).
Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 41.
Grano, supranote 33, at 918-19.
Greenawalt, supranote 26, at 41 (footnote omitted).
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counts as a legitimate argument for providing others similar
means of escape. In Professor Robinson's words, "[t ] here seems
to be no justifiable end in equal acquittal of the guilty."80 It
should follow that the moral acceptability of police tactics does
not depend upon an equal distribution of success.
Concededly, the argument for equality among defendants
has more force if the concern is unequal distribution of legal
rights. If, for example, all defendants have a right to counsel
during police interrogation, exercise of the right should not
depend upon preexisting knowledge, which only the rich or sophisticated may have. The purpose of the analysis to this point,
however, has been to determine what legal rights a suspect
should have. Escobedo premised a right to counsel on reasons
that this essay has attempted to show lack merit. If Escobedo's
reasoning is found wanting, its right to counsel is left without
justification. Thus, the equality argument is needed to support
the right to counsel. To attempt now to premise the equality
argument on a preexisting right to counsel is to engage in circular reasoning.
All else having failed, the temptation will arise to insist that
the Constitution itself is the justification for the right to counsel.
This, of course, is a makeweight argument. If the Constitution
spoke in unmistakable terms, the Court in Escobedo would not
have been compelled to offer reasons for applying the right to
counsel to the police station. While the sixth amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel in "all criminal prosecutions,"8'
the applicability of this right to the investigatory stages of the
criminal process is not self-evident from the text. This is why
the emphasis on underlying theoretical justification is necessary.82
No more than its textual language, the sixth amendment's
history does not support its extension to protect a suspect from
' Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationaleeforthe Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 412, 421 (1965) (footnote omitted); see also Caplan, supra note 23,
at 1456-58; Grano, supranote 33, at 914-15; Inbau, Over-Reaction-The Mischiefof Miranda v. Arizona, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797, 808-09 (1982); Letter from Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach to Judge David Bazelon (June 24, 1965), reprinted in Kamisar, Has the Court Left the
Attorney Behind?---theBazelon-Katzenbad Letteis on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 54 KY. LJ. 461,490-94 (1966) (questioning why the gangster should be the model and all
others raised, in the name of equality, to the same level of success in suppressing evidence).
' 1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Cf Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1298-99 (1983) (making a
similar argument with regard to the first amendment).
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the investigatory process. The right to counsel evolved on the
battleground of the criminal trial; it sprang from complaints
that a defendant without counsel's assistance could not adequately defend himself in court against legal charges. The use
of counsel to shield the defendant from detection is fundamentally different, and is not supported by the history of the right to
counsel. As I have shown in another article, precedent also did
not support the Court's extension of the right to counsel to
shield a suspect from the discovery of incriminating evidence.8s
The only remaining justification for so extending the right to
counsel is policy. I have attempted to demonstrate in this essay,
however, that we do not have good reasons for injecting counsel
as an obstacle to successful police interrogation. To the contrary, as the authors maintain, we have sound reasons for permitting the police, within limits, to employ interrogation tactics
designed to outwit the suspect."
B. THE ARGUMENT FOR PERMITTING SOME PRESSURE TO CONFESS

The above discussion, though adequate in terms of Escobedo's reasoning, has not taken account of the fifth amendment
concerns that informed Miranda. Even if we lack good reasons
for assisting the suspect to make informed, intelligent decisions,
limitations on police interrogation may be defended as necessary to protect the suspect's right not to be compelled to become a witness against himself. Similarly, even if Escobedo's
" See Grano, The Right to Counsek ColateralIssuesAffectingDueProcers,54 MINN. L. REV. 1175,

1190-92 (1970).
" See Grano, supra note 33, at 943. I previously have defended application of sixth amendment rights to investigatory procedures once adversary, judicial proceedings have commenced.
See id. at 942-44; Grano, supranote 19, at 18-31. This is the Court's current view. See note 19 suprm. I now have doubts whether the sixth amendment's "shield" function is appropriate at any
stage of the process.
, See Grano, supra note 19, at 19 n.117. The Constitution still does not provide a right to
counsel during questioning by an investigative grand jury. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564 (1976).
" In one of their most colorful examples, the authors describe how an interrogator called his
secretary into the interrogation room where one suspect was being questioned, leaving a cosuspect alone in the waiting room. Thereafter, the secretary returned to the waiting room and
began typing, ostensibly from the note pad she had taken into the interrogation room. She
even paused to ask the co-suspect how the suspect in the interrogation room spelled his name.
When the interrogator subsequently called the co-suspect in for interrogation, he had little
trouble obtaining the confession. Why we would want to protect guilty suspects from such brilliant trickery escapes me.
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reasoning does not support a right to counsel, such a right, as
Mirandaconcluded, may be defensible in the interest of protecting fifth amendment rights. My purpose now is to show that
Miranda'spremises are equally as unsound as Escobedo's.
The first step to sound analysis is to recognize that, despite
the frequent incantation of the phrase, no "privilege against
self-incrimination" exists in our law. Because the fifth amendment protects only testimonial or communicative evidence, the
state may compel a person to produce self-incriminating physiMore fundamentally for present purposes, the
cal evidence.
fifth amendment protects not against self-incrimination but
agast the state compelling a person to be a witness against himself. Absent compulsion, a self-incriminating admission is not
presumptively suspicious. "Indeed, far from being prohibited
by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not
coerced, are inherently desirable." 89 Finally, unlike true privileges that protect the privacy of communications, the fifth
amendment "privilege" is not concerned at all with securing a
zone of privacy for the individual, for with a grant of immunity,
the state can compel the individual to tell all regardless of how
embarrassing disclosure may be.90
Because confessions are testimonial evidence intended for
use in the criminal trial, the fifth amendment issue turns on the
concept of compulsion. What does it mean to compel a person
to be a witness against himself? Historically, compulsion was
nothing more than the requirement, under penalty of law, that
the individual respond to questions under oath.91 This requirement subjected the individual to "the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt."9 2 Such legal compulsion,
with its concomitant trilemma, is not present in the stationhouse, and powerful arguments have been made, though they
lately have been ignored, that the fifth amendment simply has
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (handwriting sample); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966) (blood sample); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
396-401 (1976) (subpoena for documents).
'Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77 (1976) (search for incriminating documents);
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
"United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
" Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
" Grano, supra note 33, at 926-28 & n.347; see alsoY. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 36-37 (but
finding this an unpersuasive reason for not applying the fifth amendment to the police station).
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Commn.,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
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nothing to do with the issue of police interrogation. 3 Semantically, of course, it is virtually impossible for the Supreme Court
to reverse its position on this. One can imagine the reaction
were the Court to rule that the Constitution no longer prohibits
the police from compelling a custodial suspect to incriminate
himself. Realistically, therefore, we are left with the task of defining compulsion in the context of police interrogation.
Mere questioning by itself is not equivalent to compulsion.
Thus, a grand jury may question even a target of its investigation, and the target must invoke the right not to answer incriminating questions.94 Similarly, although the police have no
authority to insist on answers outside the custodial context, 95 a
person subject to noncustodial questioning must assert the right
not to answer. Absent a claim that the interrogator has a right
to an answer, to question is not to compel.
Because compulsion in the context of police interrogation
refers neither to legal compulsion nor to the mere fact of questioning, it can be understood only as a synonym for coercion.
That is, the fifth amendment in this context protects a person
from being coerced to become a witness against himself. This,
of course, is precisely what the due process voluntariness cases
protected against. Professor Kamisar may rail against those who
view the fifth amendment in the police station as "little, if anything, more than the 'voluntary' test masquerading under a different label,"9 but it cannot be anything more. While the
meaning of coercion may differ for due process and fifth
amendment purposes, both doctrines necessarily address the
same evil.
The difficulty lies in determining when permissible pressure
shades into coercion or "compulsion." Professor Kamisar has
attempted to provide an answer:
It has been said that "there are a thousand forms of compulsion"
and that "our police show great ingenuity in the variety employed." But
"a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may
See, e.g.,
3J.WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 823 at 250 n.5 (3d ed. 1940); see also &Lat §§ 817-20, 823 (Chadbourn rev.
§§ 2250, 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But seeY. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 36-37
1970); 8 id.

(fifth amendment's "tangled and obscure history" permits, although it does not dictate, its application to the police station).
'*
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564 (1976).
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
"Y.KAMISAR, supranote 13, at 67.
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have been the character of the compulsion." If the police conduct is designed and likely to pressure or persuade, or even "to exert a tug on" a
suspect to incriminate himself... then that conduct is "compulsion" as
Mirandadefines the self-incrimination clause. Then it augments or intensiis the tolerable level of stress, confusion, and anxiety generated by
arrest and detention to the impermissible level of "comunadulterated
97
pulsion."

A confession must be excluded "whatever may have been
the character of the compulsion"? A tactic imposes "compulsion" even if it merely exerts "a tug" on the suspect? If Professor
Kamisar is correct, everything the authors recommend in their
book is "compulsion." But is Kamisar correct? Does even he
really believe these claims?
Professor Kamisar acknowledges that "[d]istinguishing degrees . . . is inherent in the process of defining 'compel."' 9
While acknowledging that all police questioning, whether custodial or not, generates some pressure, he candidly concedes
that the fifth amendment does not protect against all pressure."
Indeed, Professor Kamisar has stated forthrightly that "[z]eroIf the
value pressure conditions" are impossible to attain.9
definition of "compel" is a matter of degree, 1 1 some justification
is needed for defining the word in the way Miranda did and
Kamisar would. Recognizing that the fifth amendment does not
prohibit the pressure generated by the officer's badge in the
non-custodial context, we need to ask why it should prohibit the
inherent pressure of custodial questioning or even the pressures
generated by the authors' tactics. Stated differently, only a policy analysis can provide the appropriate definition of compulsion.

Id. at 160 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
R Id. at 42 n.2.

9Id.
" Id. at 155 n.20.
...
Of course, the definition of "compel" must be a matter of degree. Kamisar is right that
zero-value pressure simply is impossible. On the other hand, no matter how great the pressure,
an undrugged, conscious person always can choose to endure. Thus, unless the issue is seen as
one of degree, either all statements are coerced or none are. From a legal perspective, neither
alterative is satisfactory. Words like "compel," "coerce," and "voluntary," therefore, must draw
their meaning from policy considerations, and their meaning accordingly should vary in different legal contexts. Grano, supranote 33, at 862-63, 880-86. Try as we may, we cannot escape justice Harlan's insight that the question must be "how much pressure on the suspect [is]
permissible." Miranda,384 U.S. at 507, 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also note 36 supra and
accompanying text.
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An expansive view of "compulsion" cannot be premised on
a dislike of self-incriminating statements. As discussed in the
last section of this essay, our morality approves interrogation
tactics, including trickery and deception, intended to convince a
suspect to confess. Moreover, as noted above, the fifth amendment does not provide protection against self-incrimination as
such. 02 If we prefer that suspects tell the truth-if, that is, we
prefer the police to succeed with interrogation-we should not
define compulsion so as to eliminate all "tugs" on the suspect to
confess. The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the fifth
amendment does not require such protection:
The Constitution does not prohibit every element which influences
a criminal suspect to make incriminating admissions. Of course, for
many witnesses the grand jury room engenders an atmosphere conducive to truthtelling, for it is likely that upon being brought before such a
body of neighbors and fellow citizens, and having been placed under a
solemn oath to tell the truth, many witnesses will feel obliged to do just
that. But it does not offend the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment if in
that setting a witness is more likely to tell the truth than in less solemn
surroundings. The constitutional guarantee is only that the witness not
be compeled to give self-incriminating testimony.

The policies underlying the fifth amendment do not suggest
that we should protect the defendant from either the inherent
pressures of custodial interrogation or the authors' anxietyinducing tactics. The protection embodied in the fifth amendment arose in the midst of stormy political controversies concerning the English church courts and the Star Chamber. 1 4 We
cannot be sure whether this protection developed as a tactical
weapon against these institutions or whether it had its own independent justifications. The justifications we typically see today are largely after-the-event formulations.105 For this reason,
they deserve especially careful scrutiny.
In Miranda, the Court stated that the "one overriding
thought" underlying the fifth amendment "is the respect a government.., must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.""
As discussed in the previous section of this essay,
"'See notes 88-89 supraand accompanying text.

United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1977) (citations omitted, emphasis in

original).
"'SeeL. LEVY,ORIGINS OFTHE FIFrH AMENDMENT (1968).
For an exhaustive review of possible underlying policies, see McNaughton, The Priviege
Against Se4Incrimination:Its ConstitutionalAffectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications,
in POLICE POWER AND INDIIDUAL FREEDOM 223 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
I" Miranda,384 U.S. at 460.
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however, our morality does not consider the tactics of successful
interrogation an affront to human dignity. Miranda also indicated that the fifth amendment seeks to maintain a "fair stateindividual balance" and to require the government "to shoulder
the entire load."'0 7 The concept of fairness, however, like the
concept of dignity, requires analysis. The previous section argued that our morality does not consider it "unfair" for the state
to succeed in obtaining a confession or a conviction. Likewise,
only a sporting theory of justice could favor equality between
the suspect and the state for its own sake.08 It also is fiction to
say that our legal system requires the government to shoulder
the entire load. We require the defendant to stand in lineups
for identification, to provide fingerprints, blood, and handwriting samples, to submit to psychiatric examinations, to provide
pretrial discovery of certain defenses and witnesses, and sometimes even to respond to subpoenas for documents.' 9 We also
permit grand juries to subpoena targets of their investigations."0
Of course, one may attempt to distinguish these practices from
police interrogation. The point remains, however, that in defining the concept of compulsion, the old saw that the government
must bear the entire load does not provide assistance, for it
simply is not true.
Miranda also drew support from the aphorism that ours is
an accusatorial system of justice."' This, however, is not more
true than the proposition that the government must bear the
entire load. Indeed, if our system did not have both accusatorial and inquisitorial attributes, the investigative grand jury and
the other procedures mentioned in the previous paragraph
would not be possible. Because we in fact have a mixed system
of justice,"2 the question cannot be whether police interrogation is inquisitorial, which it is, but whether we have reasons for
distinguishing this inquisitorial institution from the others we
permit in our system.
'"384 U.S. at 460 (quoting 8J. WIGMORE (McNaughton rev.), supranote 93,at 317).
,"See notes 58-63 supraand accompanying text.
'"See Grano, supranote 33, at 934 (reviewing cases).
,oUnited States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
" Miranda,383 U.S. at 460.'
"'See Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: InquisitorialThemes in American CriminalProcedure,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1009 (1974). The error of regarding our system as "accusatorial" and not "inquisitorial" is not harmless. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1148 (StevensJ., dissenting) (building on premise that ours is an accusatorial system).
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Professor Kamisar's protests notwithstanding, good reasons
do not exist for defining fifth amendment compulsion any differently than due process coercion. As a policy word, the concept of compulsion necessarily must reflect society's desire, on
the one hand, for successful police interrogation and society's
revulsion, on the other hand, of certain offensive police methods." 3 Only such a balancing can define the point at which the
pressure to confess becomes "undue."n4 To ignore this reality is
to overlook, as even Professor Kamisar has conceded,115 that distinguishing degrees is inherent in the process of defining the
concept of compulsion.
This approach to fifth amendment compulsion actually
comports with both pre-Miranda and post-Miranda precedent.
When the Court in the nineteenth century first suggested in a
federal case that the fifth amendment had some bearing on police interrogation, it expressed the applicable test in terms of a
voluntariness standard, and it declined to hold that either custody or questioning automatically invalidated a confession.1
Similarly, a fifth amendment voluntariness test controlled questioning of the defendant at the preliminary examination, a
practice that persisted in this country until the middle of the
nineteenth century.1 1 7 When the Court first applied the fifth
amendment to the states, it observed that the due process voluntariness doctrine in state confession cases reflected fifth
amendment requirements." 8 Outside the custodial context,
where the fifth amendment but not Mirandaapplies, the admissibility of confessions is governed by a voluntariness test."19
Moreover, while Miranda's prophylactic rule does not prevent
the use for impeachment purposes of a statement obtained in
"' See generally Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Cf.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (drawing on the due process confession cases
to define the concept of voluntary consent). In its recent Miranda cases, the Court has recognized these competing concerns. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144 (1986). The
Court has never recognized, however, that these concerns cannot properly be balanced as long
as Mirandaremains viable.
"'Seenote 36 supraand accompanying text; see also Caplan, supranote 23, at 1468-76.
"See note 101 supraand accompanying text.
"'Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 558, 562 (1897).
"'
Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.
613, 623 (1896). The practice of questioning the accused at the examination ended in the middle of the nineteenth century. L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 16 (1959).
"sMalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964).

"'E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976).

1496

JOSEPHD.GRANO

[Vol. 89

violation of Miranda,an "involuntary" statement cannot be used
for any purpose.120 In short, as the Court reiterated only recently, outside the trial context the fifth amendment has imposed only a voluntariness requirement: "The constitutional
guarantee is only that the witness be not compelled to give selfincriminating testimony. The test is whether, considering the
totality of circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne..''
The remaining question is whether the suspect's "right of silence" dictates greater protection than a voluntariness approach
affords. If, as I have suggested, the first step to sound analysis is
to recognize that no "privilege against self-incrimination" exists,
the second step is to recognize, again despite the frequent incantations of the phrase, that there is no right of silence. The
fifth amendment right is a right not to be compelled to become a
witness against oneself. The right of silence exists only in the
limited sense that the state cannot compel a person to answer.
This is not just a semantic quibble. If a right of silence as
such existed, we could not justify protecting that right only for
those in custody, for the fifth amendment applies to the noncustodial as well as the custodial suspect. Similarly, the concept
of waiver would have to apply whenever the police engage in
questioning, for any response to interrogation would be a relinquishment of the "right of silence." Thus, if we truly recognized
a right of silence, Miranda's limitation of its warning and waiver
requirements to custodial interrogation could not be defended.
Of course, Miranda imposed its requirements to combat the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, but this is precisely the point; Miranda's concern, despite its loose language,
was compulsion, not a right of silence as such. If the fifth
amendment guaranteed a right of silence, even wiretapping and
the use of informants could raise troubling issues. Certainly the
use of a suspect's silence as evidence would not be impermissible only when the police provided antecedent Miranda warnings. 122
In summary, then, we have no reason to read the fifth
amendment as prohibiting police interrogation, as protecting
against the inherent pressure of custodial interrogation, or as
NewJersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
I

United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (emphasis in original).
SSeeWainwrightv. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
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prohibiting the tactics the authors suggest to increase the suspect's anxiety in the police station. The authors' tactics are inconsistent with Miranda's premises, but it is those premises, not
their tactics, that lack persuasive justification.
IV. CONCLUSION

I have attempted to show in this essay that the authors' suggested tactics for successful police interrogation are inconsistent
with the two strands of thought that have influenced modem
confessions law. I also have attempted to demonstrate that both
of these strands of thought are unsound. Nothing in our Constitution or our morality precludes the police, within limits,
from trying to outsmart the suspect and to increase the pressure
on him to tell the truth. Indeed, our morality actually approves
such interrogation efforts.
The Supreme Court has applied the right to counsel to police interrogation both to help the suspect make informed, intelligent decisions and to protect him from interrogation's
inherent pressures. I have tried to show in this essay that neither justification is persuasive and that both run counter to the
appropriate functions and goals of police interrogation. Of
course, with unexacting waiver requirements, the authors' program for professional interrogation can coexist with a right of
counsel, but only intellectual dishonesty can make such coexistence theoretically compatible. If my arguments against the
premises of Escobedo and Mirandaare persuasive, counsel should
be barred, for all defendants, from the interrogation room.
The law openly should permit, as the authors desire, a reasonable period of custodial interrogation once a suspect has
been arrested on probable cause.s While the police should not
be permitted to assert that the suspect must answer their questions, they should have leeway to attempt to convince him to tell
the truth. The law should preclude tactics that are likely to induce a false confession, and it likewise should preclude tactics
that offend well-established moral principles. In short, whether

, Cf. Proposed Mich. Ct. R. 6.104(A): "An arrested person must be taken without unnecessary delay before ajudicial officer for arraignment in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
A delay is not "unnecessary" solely because the police interrogated the accused before bringing
him to court." 422A Mich. 10 (1985). [The author of this review is reporter of the committee
that submitted Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure to the Michigan Supreme Court. The

Court has published the proposed rules for public comment.].
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under due process or the fifth
amendment, some form of volun24
tariness test should control.
If we really believed in the philosophy that underlies cases
like Escobedo and Miranda,we would have to regard CriminalInterrogationand Confessions as a blueprint for police illegality. It is
no such thing. The book is a manual for successful interrogadon that a free, civilized, and just society can and should endorse without apology. We are indebted to the authors for
helping to demonstrate how misguided our recent direction has
been.

" I previously have recommended that the Court revert to a modified voluntariness test.
Grano, supranote 33; see also Caplan, supra note 23, at 1467-76 (arguing that Mirandashould be
overruled).

